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THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
AND THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
Gillian E. Metzger* & Trevor W. Morrison**
INTRODUCTION
Every American law student learns that there is a difference between a
statute’s meaning and its constitutionality. A given case might well present
both issues, but law students are taught that the questions are distinct and
that their resolution requires separate analyses. This is all for good reason:
the distinction between statutory meaning and constitutional validity is both
real and important. But it is not complete. Any approach to statutory
interpretation depends on a view about the appropriate role of the judiciary
(or other institutional interpreter) in our constitutional system; “[a]ny theory
of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law.”1
Moreover, some specific rules of statutory interpretation can themselves be
understood as modes of constitutional implementation.
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius2 (NFIB)—and,
in particular, the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s
“individual mandate” under the tax power—is a prime example of
constitutional and statutory intertwining. The crux of the tax question in the
case was whether Congress permissibly exercised its tax power when it
enacted the individual mandate. This was a question of both statutory
meaning and constitutional validity: Was the mandate permissibly
understood to impose a tax, and did it represent a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s tax authority? According to some—including, critically, Chief
Justice Roberts—the tax power cannot be used to command individuals.3
In the Chief Justice’s view, Congress can tax an otherwise lawful action or
failure to act, but it cannot use its tax power to enforce a command that
individuals act or not act in a particular way. Under that standard, the
mandate could be upheld under the tax power only if it could be interpreted
as taxing the decision not to purchase insurance without rendering that
* Vice Dean and Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
** Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. For an academic defense of the view that a tax cannot impose requirements or
coerce, as well as an argument that whether a measure constitutes a tax or a penalty should
be determined with reference to its material effects and not the labels Congress used, see
Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power To Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax
Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012).
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decision unlawful. Hence, whether the mandate could be upheld as a tax
turned on whether it could be construed, as a matter of statutory meaning, to
fit this constitutional definition of a tax.
The correct answer is not obvious from the text of the mandate or the
ACA as a whole. On the one hand, under the ACA the sole legal
consequence of a covered individual’s failure to purchase insurance is that
it triggers an additional fee, payable on the individual’s annual tax return.
That fact—combined with the ACA’s multiple references to the tax code
and Congress’s reliance on estimates that the mandate would raise
$4 billion annually—weighed in favor of viewing the mandate as a tax but
not a command. On the other hand, and in contrast to the ACA’s express
references to taxes elsewhere in the legislation, the ACA refers to the
mandate and its fee in terms of a “requirement” and a “penalty,” not a tax.
For those and other reasons, it could be argued that the mandate was most
naturally viewed as an exercise of the commerce power, not the tax power.
Although the parties and the Justices did not acknowledge the point with
any great clarity, resolving this statutory ambiguity required choosing
between two constitutionally based rules of statutory construction: the
principle that statutes should be construed, where possible, to avoid serious
doubts about their unconstitutionality, and the requirement that Congress
must clearly invoke its tax power before a court will review the challenged
legislation as an exercise of that power. Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling
opinion embraced the first of these rules, commonly known as the canon of
constitutional avoidance. By contrast, the joint dissent implicitly opted for
the second, essentially imposing a clear statement rule on invocations of the
tax power.
We think that the Chief Justice took the right approach, but that the
choice of which of these rules to apply requires fuller justification than the
Chief Justice supplied. In particular, we argue that adequately answering
this question necessitates a more forthright engagement with statutory
interpretation as a mode of constitutional implementation.
That
engagement should be framed around one of the bedrock principles
governing judicial review of most legislation: the presumption of
constitutionality. Ultimately, we show that analyzing the tax question in
NFIB against the presumption of constitutionality not only supports the
Chief Justice’s application of the canon of constitutional avoidance, but also
indicates that the proper clear statement rule to apply with respect to
Congress’s use of its tax power is the opposite of that suggested by the joint
dissent. The Court should not conclude that Congress refused to exercise
its tax power, or any other head of legislative authority, unless Congress
expressly stated that refusal in the statute at issue.
I. CONSTITUTION-IMPLEMENTING RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
We begin by describing two familiar interpretive approaches, the canon
of constitutional avoidance and clear statement rules. As noted above, these
principles were invoked, explicitly or implicitly, by the contending sides in
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NFIB. Both approaches blend inquiries into statutory meaning with
enforcement of constitutional norms. Yet in certain contexts they can have
dramatically different consequences.
A. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
In its most common articulation, the canon of constitutional avoidance
provides that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.”4 Most famously associated with Justice
Brandeis’s concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,5 the
avoidance canon has long been embraced by the Court as a “‘cardinal
principle’ of statutory interpretation.”6
Although it is common to speak of a single avoidance canon, in fact there
are two different versions of the rule. The first, which Adrian Vermeule
helpfully terms “classical avoidance,”7 provides that, “as between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [a court’s] plain duty is to adopt that
which will save the Act.”8 The second, which Vermeule calls “modern
avoidance,”9 is the one quoted in the above paragraph and most frequently
invoked by courts today. The key difference between the two is that
classical avoidance applies only when the otherwise preferred reading of a
statute is in fact unconstitutional, while modern avoidance applies
whenever there is serious doubt about the constitutionality of that reading.10
The Supreme Court’s early practice employed classical avoidance, which
it justified on dual grounds: first, that due respect for a coordinate branch
of government entails assuming that its work product was intended to pass
constitutional muster; and second, that unelected federal courts should
minimize, to the extent consistent with their Marbury duty, the occasions on
which they invalidate the work of the political branches.11 But in a 1909
case, United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., the
Court expressed concern that classical avoidance entails providing what
4. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
5. 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., joined by Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, JJ.,
concurring).
6. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932)). For a list of recent invocations of the avoidance canon by the Court, see
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1189, 1193 n.10 (2006) (collecting cases).
7. Adrian Vermeule , Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949–50 (1997).
8. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring in the
judgment of an equally divided Court).
9. Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1949.
10. See John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1495, 1496–97 (1997).
11. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 1203–04.
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amounts to an advisory opinion.12 To address that concern, the Court
reasoned that rather than finding a particular statutory reading
unconstitutional only to reject it in favor of a saving construction, courts
should instead construe statutes to avoid readings that raise serious
constitutional concerns, without finally resolving those concerns.13 Courts,
in other words, should employ modern avoidance.
Like classical avoidance, modern avoidance is typically justified as an
instrument of judicial restraint.14 And although the Court did not initially
put it this way, contemporary accounts of modern avoidance also suggest
that the canon respects congressional intent.15 On this account, Congress is
presumed to intend to legislate within constitutional limits and to avoid
legislating in a way that pushes the constitutional envelope.
More than classical avoidance, modern avoidance has been subject to
substantial academic criticism. Two lines of criticism are dominant. The
first targets the notion that Congress truly intends to avoid constitutional
doubts, not just outright unconstitutionality. As Judge Friendly explained, a
rational legislator would likely prefer a court to resolve decisively any
constitutional doubts it has about the otherwise best reading of a statute:
“[T]here is always the chance . . . that the doubts will be settled favorably,
and if they are not, the conceded rule of construing to avoid
unconstitutionality will come into operation and save the day. People in
such a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose position do not readily sacrifice it.”16
There is also the fact that Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”17 Attributing a
collective belief in the constitutionality of its work product may assign to
the full body something not actually present in the mind of each member
who voted for a given bill.
On the other hand, given that the initial move from classical to modern
avoidance was not justified on congressional intent grounds, but was
instead aimed at avoiding the advisory opinion problem, this criticism of
the canon as deviating from actual congressional intent may be something
of a non sequitur. If classical avoidance tracks congressional intent, and if
12. United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
13. See id.
14. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 1206–07 (describing the elements of the standard
defense of the modern avoidance canon and calling it the “judicial restraint theory” of
avoidance).
15. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (describing modern avoidance
as “a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,
resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which
raises serious constitutional doubts”); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the avoidance canon as “conform[ing] with Congress’s presumed
intent not to enact measures of dubious validity”).
16. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30, 44 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964), reprinted in HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 196, 210 (1967).
17. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle , Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent As
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
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modern avoidance is the closest the courts can come to classical avoidance
without creating advisory opinion concerns, modern avoidance’s poor fit
with congressional intent might be tolerable. Moreover, even if classical
avoidance does not lead to truly impermissible advisory opinions,18 it does
generate fully elaborated constitutional analyses in a way that modern
avoidance does not. Thus, following Justice Brandeis’s desire to minimize
the number of judicial pronouncements on the Constitution one way or the
other, modern avoidance might again be justifiable despite not always
closely tracking congressional intent.
The second main criticism of modern avoidance takes issue with the
premise of the defense just offered: it asserts that modern avoidance does
not, in fact, avoid the unnecessary making of constitutional law. In cases
where the canon applies, the reviewing court engages the constitutional
issue enough to discard its otherwise preferred reading of the statute. As
Judge Posner puts it, even if such engagements do not yield definitive
rulings on constitutional questions, they nevertheless create a “judge-made
constitutional ‘penumbra’ that has much the same prohibitory effect as the
. . . Constitution itself.”19 That might go a bit too far; there are important
differences between modern avoidance’s engagement with the Constitution
and an analysis that reaches a definitive conclusion on a constitutional
question. Still, Judge Posner and others leveling this criticism are clearly
correct that modern avoidance does not avoid the Constitution altogether.
In that sense, it arguably fails the task Justice Brandeis set for it in
Ashwander.20
There is, however, an alternative account of the avoidance canon. As
Ernest Young has described, modern avoidance can be viewed as “designed
not to reflect what Congress might have wanted under particular conditions,
but rather to give voice to [the] normative values” that are “embodied in the
underlying constitutional provisions that create the constitutional
‘doubt.’”21 When implemented through the avoidance canon, those
constitutional provisions operate as what Young calls “resistance norms”—
constitutionally grounded “rules that raise obstacles to particular
governmental actions without barring those actions entirely.”22 Put another
way, the modern avoidance canon is a tool of both statutory construction
and constitutional implementation. Indeed, it renders statutory construction
a mode of constitutional implementation.

18. One of us is on record saying that the application of classical avoidance does not
entail the issuing of a truly unconstitutional advisory opinion. See Morrison, supra note 6, at
1205.
19. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983).
20. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 87.
21. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2000).
22. Id. at 1585.
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This resistance norm account of avoidance is decidedly not how Justice
Brandeis or other early proponents of modern avoidance understood it.23 It
is, however, largely immune to the two criticisms of modern avoidance
described above. If the purpose of avoidance is to protect constitutional
values by “rais[ing] the cost of any congressional encroachment within a
particular area of constitutional sensitivity,”24 then its divergence from
congressional intent is not deeply troubling. The constitutional resistance
norm simply trumps congressional intent. Meanwhile, Judge Posner’s
complaint that avoidance creates a penumbral Constitution becomes not so
much an indictment of avoidance as a description of its purpose.25
B. Constitutional Clear Statement Rules
Clear statement rules represent yet another method of statutory
construction with a deep connection to constitutional norms. In a number
of contexts the Court requires Congress to speak clearly before a statute
will be read as trenching on important constitutional values. Prominent
among these “constitutionally inspired ‘clear statement rules’” are
requirements aimed at protecting federalism.26 Examples include the rule
that Congress must expressly state its intention to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, the presumption against preemption, and Gregory v. Ashcroft’s
insistence that “if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention
to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”27 Some of these
federalism clear statement rules apply more stringently than others. In
particular, the Court often finds state law preempted on an implied basis,
whereas it does not conclude Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign
immunity absent fairly clear statutory language to that effect.28 These
variations notwithstanding, these rules are all techniques of using statutory
construction, rather than direct constitutional adjudication, to protect a
constitutionally based balance between federal and state authority. As John
23. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 676 (2012).
24. Young, supra note 21, at 1606.
25. Id. at 1598.
26. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 406–07 (2010); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593 (1992).
27. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Manning, supra note
26, at 407–10 (discussing federalism clear statement rules).
28. Compare Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2008) (noting that
preemption analysis begins with a presumption against preemption, but “Congress may
indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its structure and
purpose”), with Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (“Congress
may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”).
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Manning has put it, these “clear statement rules share the defining feature of
trying to safeguard constitutional values without the more obviously
countermajoritarian step of invalidating acts of Congress.”29
Clear statement rules bear a close resemblance to the canon of
constitutional avoidance in that both implement constitutional norms
through statutory interpretation.30 Indeed, they often operate in the same
fashion, with courts interpreting statutes to avoid trenching on the
constitutional values at stake. One notable difference, however, is that
constitutional clear statement rules often apply in contexts in which no
constitutional bar prevents Congress from undertaking the action at issue.
As a result, Congress usually can respond to judicial decisions applying a
clear statement requirement by expressly authorizing the action, and the
Court will not hold Congress’s action unconstitutional. By contrast, in
constitutional avoidance contexts there is often a real risk that the
alternative disfavored interpretation would be found unconstitutional, and
thus Congress does not have the same room to respond with express
authorization.31 Yet the significant obstacles standing in the way of
reenacting a statutory provision with requisite clarity minimize the import
of this distinction in practice, and the constitutional avoidance canon is
often characterized as one species of the wider genus of constitutional clear
statement rules.32
Not surprisingly then, many of the complaints lodged against the
avoidance canon are also raised against constitutional clear statement rules
more generally. They are attacked for leading courts to deviate from likely
congressional intent and for illegitimately increasing constitutional
constraints on the legislature.33 The latter criticism is even more applicable
to constitutional clear statement rules than to the avoidance canon, since the
former typically apply in circumstances where Congress undoubtedly has
the authority to take the underlying legislative step at issue. Defenders of
constitutional clear statement rules often respond that the constitutional
norms served by such rules tend to be underenforced in direct litigation, due
to limits on judicial competence and a doctrinal tendency to treat the
29. Manning, supra note 26, at 402.
30. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 935 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(categorizing cases employing the avoidance canon as a “line of . . . clear-statement cases”).
31. Manning, supra note 26, at 414.
32. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 26, at 599–600, 637–38; Manning, supra note
26, at 414; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000).
33. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 26, at 632–38 (critiquing clear statement
rules for prioritizing judicial over legislative value choices and for entailing judicial
enforcement of constitutional norms whose enforcement should be left to the legislature);
Schauer, supra note 20, at 74, 83, 89 (arguing that the application of constitutional clear
statement rules leads to statutory interpretations that Congress did not intend, has difficulty
overcoming, and are insufficiently justified); see also Manning, supra note 26, at 418–19,
423–26 (detailing frequent criticisms and arguing that even if clear statement rules are not as
intrusive as some argue, they produce interpretations at odds with the obvious reading of the
text and represent unjustified judicial value balancing).
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underlying norm as better suited to political enforcement. On this view,
constitutional clear statement rules are a legitimate means of ensuring that
constitutional norms are given their due weight by the legislature.34 Thus,
for example, some argue that requiring Congress to clearly state when it is
burdening the states helps reinforce the political safeguards of federalism
found in the Constitution—an approach often referred to as “process
federalism.”35 Requiring such clear language from Congress engages these
political safeguards by obliging Congress to confront the issue directly in
order to achieve the federalism-implicating result.36
Whether justified or not, little debate exists over the effect of
constitutional clear statement rules. They make it more difficult for
Congress to legislate in certain ways and contexts or on certain issues. In
addition, clear statement rules serve to make Congress’s specific legislative
language more constitutionally important than is usually the case. Although
rooted in substantive normative concerns, clear statement rules put a
premium on congressional choice of labels and other procedural legislative
choices.37 As a result, clear statement rules stand in some tension with the
Court’s general approach of not policing congressional procedures or
requiring proof that Congress adequately considered the merits of enacted
legislation unless the legislation implicates individual constitutional rights
that trigger heightened scrutiny.38 On the other hand, at least in the
federalism context, constitutional clear statement rules find some support in
recent decisions suggesting that Congress must identify the factual
predicate for a statute in order for it to fall within certain heads of
legislative authority.39
Despite their overlap and shared underpinnings, there is one area in
which the avoidance canon and clear statement rules lead to diametrically
opposed results. That area involves questions about the precise head of
legislative authority pursuant to which Congress enacted the statute in
34. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 316–17; Young, supra note 21, at 1552 (arguing that
some constitutional principles take the form of resistance norms rather than absolute
limitations on Congress). For doubts about this defense, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
26, at 633–34 (noting that arguments against judicial enforcement of structural federalism
norms through direct constitutional review also apply to statutory interpretation).
35. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349
(2001). For the canonical statement of the view that constitutional federalism is primarily
politically enforced, see Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543 (1954).
36. See Young, supra note 35, at 1359.
37. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296–98 (2008)
(noting that conditions on federal grants to the states must be “unambiguously” stated and
holding that statutory reference to “attorneys’ fees” did not unambiguously include expert
fees).
38. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
39. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)
(Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995) (Congress’s commerce power).
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question. If the courts were to require Congress to expressly invoke
particular sources of legislative authority each time it acts (and if they were
to judge the constitutionality of the enactment only against the invoked
heads of authority), the result could be a large increase in the number of
measures found unconstitutional. Potential bases for upholding a statute
that Congress did not explicitly invoke would be off the table. The
avoidance canon in contrast, has the opposite effect. If a measure would be
a constitutional exercise of a particular head of legislative power, and if it is
plausible to read the measure as an exercise of that power, then under the
avoidance canon, courts should adopt that interpretation whether or not
Congress expressly embraced the power in question. Far from requiring
Congress to state clearly the authority under which it acts, the avoidance
canon suggests that congressional failure to invoke a particular authority
should not matter if the measure nonetheless can be read as enacted on that
basis.
Despite its growing affection for clear statement rules in recent decades,
the Court has not adopted a rule of the sort just described—that is, it has not
required Congress to state expressly the head of legislative authority
pursuant to which it acts. Interestingly, there has recently been some
support in Congress for a self-imposed rule along these lines. Following
the 2010 congressional elections, the House of Representatives adopted a
rule requiring each introduced bill or joint resolution to be accompanied by
a statement of the constitutional power granted to Congress to enact the
legislation.40 Whether or not this new House rule ultimately has any
meaningful impact on congressional behavior, for its part the Court has
continued to adhere to its longstanding view that “the constitutionality of
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise.”41 Indeed, at times the Court has analyzed whether
federal legislation falls within the scope of powers that Congress plainly did
not invoke.42 Thus, for example, although over the last fifteen years the
Court has imposed greater limits on Congress’s power under Section 5 of
40. The rule provides:
A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced unless the sponsor submits for
printing in the Congressional Record a statement citing as specifically as
practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact
the bill or joint resolution. The statement shall appear in a portion of the Record
designated for that purpose and be made publicly available in electronic form by
the Clerk.
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th Cong., R. XII(7)(c)(1) (Jan. 5, 2011),
available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf. For an announcement and
description of the rule change, see New Constitutional Authority Requirement for Introduced
Legislation, HOUSE COMM. ON RULES (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.rules.house.gov/about/
PolicyDetail.aspx?NewsID=72.
41. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); see EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (“Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce.”).
42. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, it has not demanded that Congress expressly
invoke Section 5 before assessing whether the statute in question satisfies
its substantive standards. In short, clear statement rules have been applied
to determine a statute’s substantive scope, but generally not to determine
whether it is an exercise of a particular head of legislative authority.43
II. THE ACA LITIGATION AND THE TAX POWER QUESTION
The canon of constitutional avoidance, clear statement rules, and the
choice of which to apply when determining whether Congress acted under a
particular head of authority all took center stage in NFIB. A number of
lower courts refused to address the constitutionality of the individual
mandate under the tax power on the ground that Congress had not signaled
its intent to invoke that power with adequate clarity. In so holding, those
courts emphasized several textual features of the ACA, in particular that
Congress denominated the financial imposition for failing to purchase
insurance a “penalty,” despite describing it as a tax in earlier drafts of the
legislation and despite calling other ACA impositions taxes. They also
noted that Congress had included numerous findings to demonstrate that the
mandate fell under the commerce power but none to support invocation of
the tax power, such as findings on the amount of revenue the measure was
expected to generate from those who paid the penalty instead of purchasing
insurance.44
The opinion that devoted the most attention to Congress’s purported
refusal to invoke the tax power may have been that of the district court in
Health & Human Services v. Florida. There, Judge Vinson argued that,
“regardless of whether the exaction could otherwise qualify as a tax . . . , it
cannot be regarded as one if it clearly appears that Congress did not intend
it to be,” and “it is inarguably clear that Congress did not intend for the
exaction to be regarded as a tax.”45 He relied on the Supreme Court’s early
twentieth-century opinion in Helwig v. United States for the proposition that
congressional intent controls, and that “in the absence of any declaration by
Congress affecting the manner in which the provision shall be treated,
courts must decide the matter in accordance with their views of the nature
of the act.”46 Although acknowledging that current doctrine does not
require Congress to identify a particular source of power in order for it to

43. See Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 1998),
abrogated on other grounds by Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; see also Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,
43–44 (1st Cir. 1997).
44. See Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314–20 (11th Cir.
2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 550–54 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part).
45. Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1133 (N.D. Fla.
2010) (internal quotations marks omitted).
46. Id. at 1133 (quoting Hedwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903)) (emphasis
omitted).
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apply, Judge Vinson nonetheless stressed Congress’s failure to invoke the
tax power explicitly:
Congress should not be permitted to secure and cast politically difficult
votes on controversial legislation by deliberately calling something one
thing, after which defenders of that legislation take an “Alice-inWonderland” tack and argue in court that Congress really meant
something else entirely, thereby circumventing the safeguard that exists to
keep their broad power in check. If Congress intended for the penalty to
be a tax, it should go back and make that intent clear (for example, by
calling it a tax, relying on Congress’s Constitutional taxing power,
allowing it to be collected and enforced as a tax, or identifying revenue to
be raised) . . . .47

This was tantamount to imposing a clear statement rule requiring
Congress to invoke a particular power expressly in order for it to apply.
Judge Vinson’s embrace of that approach does not appear to have been
deterred by the fact that it would lead to finding a federal statute
unconstitutional. That is, Judge Vinson neither acknowledged the novelty
of imposing a clear statement rule for the purposes of identifying the source
of legislative authority pursuant to which Congress legislates, nor justified
the dramatically different consequence of applying such a rule in that
context as compared to the contexts in which clear statement rules are
typically imposed.
The joint dissent at the Supreme Court acknowledged that under the
canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court “must, ‘if fairly possible,’
construe the provision to be a tax rather than a mandate-with-penalty, since
that would render it constitutional rather than unconstitutional.”48
Nonetheless, in practice the dissenters’ approach was similar to Judge
Vinson’s, emphasizing statutory evidence that, they thought, precluded
reading the mandate as a tax. According to the joint dissent, “to say that the
Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but
to rewrite it.”49 Moreover, such rewriting in the tax context raised
constitutional accountability concerns: “Imposing a tax through judicial
legislation inverts the constitutional scheme, and places the power to tax in
the branch of government least accountable to the citizenry.”50 Its
acknowledgment of the avoidance canon notwithstanding, the joint
dissent’s analysis thus seems more in line with a clear statement approach,
especially in its insistence that the Court had “never—never—treated as a
tax an exaction which faces up to the critical difference between a tax and a
penalty, and explicitly denominates the exaction a ‘penalty.’”51

47. Id. at 1136–37 & n.7, 1143.
48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
49. Id. at 2655.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2653.
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Chief Justice Roberts saw the statutory text and the governing
constitutional considerations quite differently. He criticized the joint
dissent for treating the labels Congress used as determinative of the
constitutional inquiry, and emphasized instead the broad scope of
Congress’s taxing authority, together with the avoidance canon. In his
view, it was sufficient under the Court’s precedents that “Congress had the
power to impose the exaction in [the mandate] under the taxing power, and
that [the mandate] need not be read to do more than impose a tax.”52 On
the latter point, the Chief Justice agreed that “[t]he most straightforward
reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase
insurance,” which he deemed to be beyond Congress’s authority under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.53 But he maintained that
determining “the most natural interpretation of the mandate” was not the
proper inquiry. 54 In light of the avoidance canon, the question instead was
whether it was “fairly possible” or “reasonable” to read the mandate as
imposing a tax on the decision not to purchase insurance. Finding that the
mandate could reasonably be so characterized, Roberts sustained it under
the tax power.55
Some have criticized the Chief Justice for applying the canon of
constitutional avoidance to the tax power question at all. According to
Nicholas Rosenkranz, it was fundamentally misguided to apply avoidance
in this case because avoidance applies only to questions of statutory
interpretation and not to matters of what Rozenkranz calls “constitutional
characterization.” In Rosenkranz’s view, by construing the mandate to
afford a choice between purchasing insurance and paying a tax, “[t]he Chief
is not interpreting the meaning of a statute to avoid a constitutional
problem. Instead he is characterizing a statute—whose meaning is not in
doubt—to be a tax for purposes of the Constitution.”56 And that,
Rosenkranz maintains, was a kind of category mistake: it applied the
avoidance canon where it does not belong.
The problem with this argument is its premise—that the “meaning” of the
mandate and its accompanying exaction is “not in doubt.” Rosenkranz sees
no doubt on the matter because he sees no operative difference between a
provision that makes it unlawful not to purchase insurance and then
sanctions offenders by requiring them to pay a penalty, and a provision that
allows individuals to choose between purchasing insurance and paying a tax
equal in size to the penalty in the first scenario. In making this argument,
Rosenkranz endorses a view (commonly associated with Holmes’s “bad
52. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 2573.
54. Id. at 2594.
55. Id. at 2573, 2600.
56. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Roberts Was Wrong To Apply the Canon of
Constitutional Avoidance to the Mandate, SCOTUSREPORT (July 11, 2012 8:36 A.M.),
http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/07/11/roberts-was-wrong-to-apply-the-canon-ofconstitutional-avoidance-to-the-mandate/.
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man”), that all that matters in determining legal meaning is the law’s
material consequences.57 But that is not the only way to view the law, and
clearly the Chief Justice did not adopt that view in NFIB. Instead, he saw a
difference in legal meaning (as well as constitutional permissibility, for
purposes of the tax power) between (1) a command to purchase insurance
that renders nonpurchases unlawful and (2) a choice between the equally
lawful alternatives of purchasing insurance and paying a tax. In a sense, the
difference is largely expressive: it has to do with whether the law expresses
a view that the failure to purchase insurance is unlawful.58 But because the
Chief Justice saw that difference as significant as a matter of statutory
meaning, and because that same difference also tracked his view of the
contours of Congress’s legislative authority under the tax power, it was not
a category mistake for him to invoke avoidance.
The Chief Justice’s use of avoidance is vulnerable to other criticisms,
however. First, he construed the mandate as a tax only after considering
and definitively rejecting the constitutionality of a command-based reading
of the mandate under the Commerce Clause. The Chief Justice claimed that
he had to structure his analysis that way:
[T]he statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as
a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it.
It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a
command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is
only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly
possible, that [the mandate] can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding
the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt such a
saving construction.59

By claiming he needed to resolve the Commerce Clause question and not
simply note the existence of a serious doubt as to the mandate’s
constitutionality under that head of authority, the Chief Justice embraced
classical, not modern, avoidance. In that respect, his approach is at odds
with the dominant way the Court has employed the avoidance canon for the
last century. And for that reason, he was simply wrong, doctrinally and
logically, to say that he would have no basis to adopt the saving
construction of the mandate without first deciding the Commerce Clause
question. Applying modern avoidance, he needed only to note a serious
question as to the mandate’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause
before proceeding directly to the tax question.
The Chief Justice’s analysis is open to a second criticism as well. In
contrast to having said too much about the commerce issue, he did too little
57. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.”).
58. On expressive accounts of the law generally, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503
(2000).
59. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
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to justify the sharp contrast he drew between statutory and constitutional
questions. When determining the constitutionality of the mandate under the
tax power, the Chief Justice treated the ACA’s key statutory language very
differently than when he addressed the threshold question whether the AntiInjunction Act (AIA) barred the courts from hearing any constitutional
challenges to the mandate until it went into effect. In addressing the latter
issue, he placed great weight on the particular label Congress used in the
ACA. Because Congress denominated the imposition a “penalty” instead of
a “tax,” he reasoned, the AIA’s prohibition of suits “for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax” did not apply.60 Yet the
term “penalty” did not stop the Chief Justice from construing the mandate
as a “tax” for constitutional purposes. He justified the divergence on the
ground that one issue is purely statutory while the latter is constitutional:
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a “penalty,” not a
“tax.” But while that label is fatal to the application of the [AIA], it does
not determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of
Congress’s taxing power. It is up to Congress whether to apply the [AIA]
to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Congress’s
choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control
whether an exaction is within Congress’s constitutional power to tax.61

Simply invoking the difference between the statutory and constitutional
domains is not enough, however. The avoidance canon and clear statement
rules are both examples of techniques that blend statutory interpretation and
constitutional implementation. Yet in insisting that “Congress cannot
change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes
simply by describing it as one or the other,”62 the Chief Justice failed to
acknowledge that many clear statement rules accord great weight to the
particular terms Congress uses, or fails to use, in a statute. At the same
time, the Chief Justice himself allowed Congress’s choice of language to
affect his constitutional analysis, in that his deployment of the avoidance
canon depended on his determination that the saving construction (i.e., that
the mandate is a tax, not a command) was “fairly possible” as a matter of
the statutory text.
The Chief Justice thus did not come fully to terms with the critical
analytical questions at the heart both of this case, and, more broadly, of a
range of related issues linking statutory meaning and constitutional validity.
When and how should Congress’s choice of particular statutory language
affect whether a statute is properly understood as an exercise of a particular
head of legislative power? To what extent can Congress reject a particular
head of power as the basis for sustaining an enactment against
constitutional challenge? And why is the constitutional avoidance canon
the appropriate device here, rather than a clear statement approach? To be
60. Id. at 2581, 2583–84.
61. Id. at 2594.
62. Id. at 2583.
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sure, the joint dissent itself fares no better. It never squarely addresses the
critical questions. To make matters worse, it obscures the key interpretive
decisions by applying a clear statement requirement while invoking the
avoidance canon.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER:
IMPLICATIONS FROM THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
These questions about the proper relationship between statutory
interpretation and underlying congressional authority admit no easy
answers. A logical place to start, however, is with the basic posture courts
adopt when reviewing most constitutional challenges, including to tax
legislation: the presumption of constitutionality. In the areas where it
applies, the presumption of constitutionality is a fundamental premise of
judicial review. By attending to it, we can establish a fuller justification for
the constitutional avoidance-based approach favored by the Chief Justice
and also isolate the key shortcomings in the joint dissent’s preference for a
clear statement requirement.
A. The Presumption of Constitutionality
The presumption of constitutionality states that, except where
fundamental rights are implicated, courts should not hold legislation
unconstitutional unless the unconstitutionality is clear.63 In its most
aggressive form, articulated famously by James Bradley Thayer, the
presumption of constitutionality regards Congress as the institution with
primary responsibility for interpreting the Constitution.64 As Thayer put it,
“the constitution often admits of different interpretations; . . . there is often
a range of choice and judgment; . . . in such cases the constitution does not
impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this
range of choice; and . . . whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”65
Thayer did not shy away from the implications of this standard:
[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure as
being, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently placed
on the bench, when this measure, having been passed by the legislature in
spite of his opposition, comes before him judicially, may there find it his

63. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.)
(stating that courts should not pronounce a law unconstitutional “on slight implication and
vague conjecture,” but instead that “[t]he opposition between the constitution and the law
should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with
each other”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 393–94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (stating that courts should hold unconstitutional only those laws that are “contrary to
the manifest tenor of the Constitution” such that they create an “irreconcilable variance”).
64. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893).
65. Id. at 144.
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duty, although he has in no degree changed his opinion, to declare it
constitutional.66

Although influential and “attractive to great judges,”67 Thayer’s
particular approach sits uneasily with how the Supreme Court has come to
understand its role. Invoking Marbury v. Madison68 for the proposition that
it is the judiciary’s special role to “say what the law is,” the modern Court
has insisted that the power of judicial review is the power to exercise
independent judgment about a law’s constitutionality.69 Yet at the same
time, the Court has emphasized repeatedly that “[r]espect for a coordinate
branch of Government forbids striking down an Act of Congress except
upon a clear showing of unconstitutionality.”70 Put another way, although
the Court’s determination of constitutional invalidity always trumps the
contrary judgment of a coordinate branch, the Court should not lightly
arrive at such a determination.
In this form, the presumption of constitutionality represents the standard
approach courts take to questions of legislative constitutionality. To be
sure, the Court has pulled a number of constitutional challenges outside of
the presumption’s ambit. In particular, laws implicating fundamental
individual rights are typically viewed with judicial suspicion and will be
upheld only after searching judicial scrutiny. But legislation merely
“adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come[s] to the Court
with a presumption of constitutionality,”71 with courts presuming that facts
exist to demonstrate the reasonableness of such legislative judgments.72
Although not immune from scholarly criticism, the presumption of
constitutionality is firmly rooted as a matter of judicial practice.

66. Id.
67. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7
n.35 (1983).
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
69. See Monaghan, supra note 23, at 675 (“In City of Boerne v. Flores, to take a
prominent example, the Court, invoking Marbury, admonished Congress for attempting to
define the substantive content of the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. That task
was part of the judicial duty, not part of Congress’s legislative responsibility.”).
70. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010); see Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (“‘When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has
been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President . . . , it should
only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons.’” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 736 (1956))).
71. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) (quoting
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (noting that
courts should generally assume an adequate basis for legislating unless “facts made known
or generally assumed . . . preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the legislator”).
72. F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1447, 1452–55 (2010) (describing well-entrenched deference to legislative
factual judgments).
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Admittedly, the presumption of constitutionality is, by its terms, a
principle of constitutional adjudication, not statutory interpretation. But it
would be a mistake to assume the presumption has no impact on how courts
assign statutory meaning. If the presumption of constitutionality leads
courts to uphold enactments in the absence of evidence of clear
unconstitutionality, then ambiguity in statutory meaning can be one reason
why a statute might not be clearly unconstitutional.
B. The Presumption, the AIA, and the Tax Power
Like the avoidance canon and clear statement requirements, the
presumption of constitutionality also surfaced in NFIB. The Chief Justice
included it in his introductory statement of background constitutional
principles,73 and he referred to it obliquely at the outset of his tax power
analysis by emphasizing the importance of “[g]ranting the [ACA] the full
measure of deference owed to federal statutes.”74 But when it came to
interpreting the ACA’s terms, the Chief Justice turned more directly to the
avoidance canon. This was not a huge leap, since both the avoidance canon
and the presumption tilt in favor of upholding legislation against
constitutional attack. Yet had he devoted greater attention to the basis and
operation of the presumption, the Chief Justice might have been in a
position to offer a more complete defense of his interpretive approach.
One place where Chief Justice Roberts could have put the presumption to
good use was in explaining why Congress’s choice of the “penalty” label
was determinative of the AIA jurisdiction question but not of whether the
mandate could be upheld under the tax power. As noted above, the Chief
Justice’s insistence that the statutory and constitutional domains are simply
separate is unsatisfying, given the obvious connections between the two in
some contexts (including in his own opinion, when he turned to the
avoidance canon). The presumption of constitutionality, however, offers a
more convincing justification.
Whether or not a statutorily denominated “penalty” triggers the AIA
jurisdictional bar does not implicate the presumption, because neither
answer to that question places the challenged statute in constitutional
jeopardy. In contrast, allowing Congress’s choice of label to take the tax
power completely off the table would have run headlong into the
presumption of constitutionality. It would have resulted in the mandate
being held unconstitutional even if the substantive operation of the
provision fell entirely within Congress’s legislative authority. As the Chief
Justice explained, it would mean that, “even if the Constitution permits
Congress to do exactly what we interpret this statute to do, the law must be
73. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (“‘Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the
government’ requires that [the Court] strike down an Act of Congress only if ‘the lack of
constitutional authority . . . is clearly demonstrated.’” (quoting United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 635 (1883))).
74. Id. at 2594.
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struck down because Congress used the wrong labels.”75 Such an
unforgiving stance is very difficult to square with the idea at the heart of the
presumption—that Congress should be presumed to intend to legislate
within constitutional bounds. The presumption of constitutionality thus
offers a more robust basis for treating the ACA’s text quite differently when
determining the AIA’s application than when assessing the tax power’s
applicability.
C. The Presumption, Avoidance, Clear Statement Rules, and
Congressional Power
It should be clear by now that the presumption of constitutionality and
the avoidance canon are closely aligned. Both lead the Court to construe
statutes to preserve their constitutionality, where possible. The Court has
defended both on similar grounds—respect for Congress’s own duty of
constitutional fidelity and mindfulness of the countermajoritarian character
of judicial review, in addition to Congress’s superior institutional ability to
make the factual determinations upon which an enactment’s
constitutionality might depend.76 The Chief Justice’s reliance on the
avoidance canon in NFIB is thus defensible as consistent with those basic
reasons.
What of a clear statement approach? It, too, provides an analytical
method for determining whether, in a given case, a particular source of
constitutional power is in play. And it at least arguably does so in service
of some venerable underlying values. As Judge Vinson suggested in the
Florida ACA litigation, process concerns provide the strongest argument for
requiring Congress to invoke the tax power clearly before the mandate is
upheld as a tax. In recognizing the constitutional breadth of the tax power,
the Court has emphasized that “[t]he remedy for excessive taxation is in the
hands of Congress, not the courts.”77 A clear statement rule for invoking
the tax power could reinforce that political constraint by ensuring that
members of Congress were aware that a measure constituted a tax and were
on record supporting it as such. As noted above, other constitutional clear
statement rules are frequently justified on similar process grounds.78
There are a number of problems, however, with adopting a clear
statement approach to resolving questions like the tax power issue in NFIB.
First, even on its own terms, a process-based defense of a tax power clear
statement rule is open to question. To begin with, it simply assumes that
additional clarity is needed in order to ensure political accountability for
75. Id. at 2597.
76. Hessick, supra note 72, at 1449 (“Courts have based the presumption of
constitutionality on three reasons: to show due respect to the judgments of legislators . . . ;
to promote democracy by preventing courts from interfering with decisions rendered by the
elected legislature; and to take advantage of the legislature’s superior institutional design”
when it comes to making factual determinations.).
77. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953).
78. See, e.g., Young, supra note 35.
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exercises of the tax power. But that assumption could be wrong. It seems
especially questionable in the context of legislation like the ACA, which
was passed after one of the most politically contentious and closely watched
legislative battles in recent years, with the ACA’s opponents frequently
attacking the mandate as a tax.79 At a minimum, if the assumption about
the need for additional clarity is meant to reflect how clear statement rules
actually operate on Congress, then further empirical investigation is
warranted. In a legislative system like ours that is so replete with
“vetogates,” any requirement of specific text makes legislation harder to
enact.80 Clear statement rules might simply make certain types of
legislative enactments more difficult to pass, without necessarily increasing
political accountability in the form of greater congressional or public
awareness.
In fact, a clear statement rule might actually undermine democratic
values by transferring power from legislative majorities to legislative
minorities.81 True, the process constraints imposed by the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment already inhibit the power of
simple majorities in either the House or Senate. But those rules are
expressly provided in the Constitution. The mere fact of their existence
does not justify heightening minorities’ control over legislation still further
through the crafting of a new clear statement rule.82 Indeed, a clear
statement requirement for the invocation of the tax power would stand in
substantial tension with the breadth of the constitutional grant of the tax
power and the lenient standard by which tax legislation is generally
reviewed.83 This marks a stark contrast with other clear statement rules,
which aim to protect well-established constitutional norms such as
sovereign immunity.
More fundamentally, subjecting the tax power to a clear statement
requirement would not just break new doctrinal ground, it would also have
a very different effect than the various federalism-enforcing and other clear
statement rules contained in existing doctrine. The existing rules generally
narrow the substantive scope of the laws to which they apply, not the
source of legislative authority pursuant to which Congress may be deemed
to have acted. The difference is significant. Whereas clear statement rules
focusing on the former generally lead courts to confine statutes to

79. See DAN BALZ, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW HEALTH-CARE
LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 1, 7 (2010).
80. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444–48 (2008).
81. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 26, at 637–40 (underscoring the
countermajoritarian concerns raised by clear statement rules).
82. See Manning, supra note 26, at 427–39 (challenging the legitimacy of clear
statements rules that seek to enforce general constitutional values beyond the specific
embodiment of such values in the Constitution).
83. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983);
Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89–91 (2012).
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constitutionally safe terrain and then uphold them on those grounds, a clear
statement rule operating on the latter would lead courts to invalidate a
statute when it is not sufficiently clear that Congress intended to exercise a
head of legislative authority that would be sufficient to uphold the law.
In addition to departing dramatically from existing clear statement rules,
a clear statement rule that narrows the available sources of legislative
authority would conflict sharply with the presumption of constitutionality.
By directing that legislation be upheld except where clearly
unconstitutional, the presumption gives Congress the benefit of the
constitutional doubt. But a rule requiring Congress to clearly invoke its tax
authority before an enactment is upheld on that ground would have
precisely the opposite effect, as the NFIB joint dissent and lower court
decisions like Judge Vinson’s so vividly illustrate.
Respecting the presumption of constitutionality thus entails rejecting any
requirement that Congress expressly identify the head of legislative
authority under which it acts. To be sure, Congress may need to
demonstrate that the substantive predicates for invoking a particular
authority are met. Thus, for example, the Court has stated that Congress
must establish an ongoing pattern of unconstitutional state action in order to
pass legislation enforcing the relevant constitutional norm pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 But imposing such evidentiary
requirements is quite different from invalidating legislation because
Congress did not invoke its Section 5 power with adequate clarity. These
substantive constitutional requirements must be satisfied regardless of
whether Congress invokes the Section 5 power as the basis for legislation,
and if they are met then a legislative measure can fall within the Section 5
power even though Congress was silent about its intent to exercise its
Section 5 power.85
D. A More Difficult Question About a Different Kind of Clear Statement
Although not raised in NFIB itself, a related question involves whether
and to what extent Congress can prevent the courts from upholding the
constitutionality of challenged legislation based on a particular head of
legislative authority. That is, even if the courts should not impose a clear
84. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (holding that Title I of the
ADA exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power because “[t]he
legislative record of the ADA . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled”). The Court
has sometimes sustained measures based on evidence of unconstitutional state actions not
expressly invoked by Congress, raising questions about the extent to which Congress itself
must give voice to this evidence for the enforcement power to apply. See Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509, 524 (2004) (upholding Title II of the ADA based in part on evidence of
discrimination against the disabled “documented in this Court’s cases”).
85. See Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 930 n.2, 936 (7th Cir. 2000) (sustaining
the Equal Pay Act under the Section 5 power as applied to the states, even though Congress
only expressly invoked the commerce power).
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statement requirement on Congress’s use of the tax (or any other) power,
what should courts do if Congress clearly states an intent not to use a
particular power when enacting a particular provision?
We regard this as a difficult question. On the one hand, respecting
Congress might seem to entail crediting its decisions about which sources
of legislative authority to invoke. A judicial refusal to honor such
congressional choices could undermine the political checks against
Congress’s abuse of its powers. On the other, some political checks would
still remain even if Congress were not able to preclude judicial
consideration of a given head of authority. Legislation would still need to
be actually enacted before courts could consider any challenges to its
constitutionality, and so the constraints of bicameralism and presentment
would continue to apply.
In addition, congressional efforts to preclude courts from sustaining
legislation on a particular constitutional basis could risk unwarranted
legislative intrusion into the core judicial function of constitutional
adjudication. On this view, in rejecting certain heads of authority, Congress
is not simply exercising its own independent interpretive authority but is
also seeking to dictate the terms of constitutional adjudication by the courts.
Requiring courts to defer to such maneuvers could thus threaten basic
separation of powers principles. Yet at the same time, judicial refusal to
credit Congress’s announcement about which powers it is exercising in a
given context might also be thought to risk serious damage to other
separation of powers principles that reserve the discretion inherent in
legislating to Congress, not the courts.
The presumption of constitutionality cannot solve this puzzle, but it can
limit the problem’s scope. To honor the presumption, we think courts
should at least require clear evidence before concluding that Congress has
in fact rejected a particular power. And interestingly, this suggests that the
appropriate clear statement rule in this context is the opposite of the one
suggested by the NFIB joint dissent and Judge Vinson’s opinion below.
Instead of requiring Congress to expressly invoke a given head of
legislative power before examining the constitutionality of a given
enactment under that power, courts should require Congress to expressly
renounce a head of power before taking it off the table. Put another way,
courts should err on the side of keeping any available source of legislative
authority on the table unless Congress clearly and expressly disavows it.
Applied to legislation enacted pursuant to the new House rule described
above,86 we think that even express invocation of fewer than all available
heads of legislative power should not be enough to disregard the heads of
power not invoked. That is, if a particular bill could arguably be upheld
under either or both of the commerce and tax powers, and if the House
expressly identifies only the commerce power as the source of authority for
the bill without saying anything about the tax power, we think that silence
86. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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should probably not be enough to take the tax power off the table. Instead,
the presumption of constitutionality should keep the tax power on the table
unless and until Congress explicitly disavows it, not just omits mention of
it.
CONCLUSION
In relying on the presumption of constitutionality to sort out the choice
between the avoidance canon and a clear statement rule in a case like NFIB,
our analysis has largely accepted the legitimacy of the presumption. Our
project has been to explore the presumption’s implications, as well as its
relationship to the other interpretive principles discussed here. Some
commentators—including, tellingly, one of the architects of the
constitutional challenge to the ACA’s individual mandate—have urged
courts to abandon the presumption of constitutionality altogether, and
instead to approach all or most legislation with much greater constitutional
skepticism.87 Similarly, in the NFIB oral argument, Justice Kennedy
expressed skepticism about the presumption’s applicability to assessing the
constitutionality of the individual mandate: “I understand that we must
presume laws are constitutional, but, even so, when you are changing the
relation of the individual to the government in . . . what we can stipulate is,
I think, a unique way, do you not have a heavy burden of justification to
show authorization under the Constitution?”88
For those inclined to limit or abandon the presumption of
constitutionality, our argument is unlikely to persuade.
But the
presumption is a well-established, longstanding tenet of the American
constitutional tradition.89 Abandoning it would be a radical departure from
established judicial practice. The Court did not take such a step in NFIB,
and thus the presumption of constitutionality continues to be a foundational
principle of judicial review. It provides robust justification of Chief Justice
Roberts’s reliance on the avoidance canon to uphold the individual mandate
under the tax power, and it counts powerfully against the sort of clear
statement rule favored by the joint dissent.

87. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 259 (2004) (urging “shifting the background interpretive presumption of
constitutionality whenever legislation restricts the liberties of the people” and adopting
instead a “Presumption of Liberty”).
88. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf.
89. Hessick, supra note 72, at 1455.

